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Abstract 
This paper explores the relationship between public opinion data and the consequent policy 
decisions enacted by the federal government. Specifically, it will examine President Trump’s 
policy implementations regarding the United States’ role in foreign affairs. Multiple public 
opinion polls, both domestic and international, will be utilized throughout to establish an 
understanding of the public’s complex views of this role. Antecedent to this, however, the nature 
of public opinion will be reviewed by providing a definition for public opinion, examining the 
various influences throughout one’s life, evaluating the criticisms and problems associated with 
it, and understanding how it ultimately relates to policy making. Significant policy decisions 
executed by President Trump will be discussed, including the Paris Agreement, North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and Iran nuclear deal. His continually developing relationships 
with nations such as Russia, North Korea, and China will also be examined. Notable legal cases 
involving executive orders issued by President Trump will be assessed, namely the “Travel 
Ban,” family separations, and the Flores Settlement Agreement (FSA). Through in-depth 
analysis, the paper will illustrate that public opinion, especially among American citizens, does 
not significantly affect President Trump’s decision making when leading the United States in 
world affairs. 
Keywords: North American Free Trade Agreement, Flores Settlement Agreement  
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The Realities of the Most Powerful Office in the World: A Comparison Between Public Opinion 
and the Legal Underpinning for Executive Actions in U.S. Foreign Affairs 
Introduction 
“From this moment on, it’s going to be America first…Together, we will make America strong 
again. We will make America wealthy again. We will make America proud again. We will make 
America safe again. And, yes, together, we will make America great again” 
Donald J. Trump 
On Friday, January 20th, 2017, President-elect Donald J. Trump echoed these words in his 
inaugural address to not only the people present in Washington D.C. and those watching across 
the United States, but to the entire world (The Inaugural Address, 2017). With these words, 
President Trump began a campaign to implement foreign affairs in his own form and fashion yet 
simultaneously created a stark division in public opinion. In order to understand the effects of 
this on his foreign policy, I will first discuss the nature of public opinion and what factors play a 
role in the development of an individual’s core thoughts, beliefs, and ideals. Next, I examine the 
general opinions of the public, both domestic and foreign, regarding President Trump. By 
scrutinizing his policy decisions in various foreign affairs, a comparison to what the public 
wishes the United States’ role in world affairs would be will be made. Finally, I assess the 
significant legal cases that have ensued regarding two specific executive orders: the “Travel 
Ban” and the separation of migrant families. By consistently exploring the relationship between 
public opinion and President Trump’s policy implementations I have found, as a result of often 
repudiating it, that public opinion, especially among American citizens, does not significantly 
influence President Trump in the majority of his policy decisions regarding U.S. action in foreign 
affairs. Ultimately, he has and will continue to fulfill his promise of “making America great 
again” by unremittingly positioning “America first” in his relations with foreign nations. 
The Nature of Public Opinion 
“…public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail. Without it, nothing 
can succeed.” 
          Abraham Lincoln 
"The voice of the people has been said to be the voice of God; and however generally this maxim 
has been quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent and changing; they 
seldom judge or determine right.” 
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Alexander Hamilton 
"In no country is public opinion so powerful as in the United States." 
James Bryce 
Defining Public Opinion 
The Declaration of Independence asserts that governments “deriv[e] their just powers 
from the consent of the governed.” This contention implies that the government would have no 
legitimate powers if citizens chose to withdraw their consent. Consequently, when political 
leaders feel constrained by public opinion, they often attempt to influence it. For example, 
presidents strive to garner support during wartime because they urge citizens to make immense 
sacrifices, such as sending their children off to war (Glynn, Herbst, Lindeman, O’Keefe, Shapiro, 
2018). 
Public opinion can be defined as the aggregate of the views of individual adults on 
matters of public interest. “Adults” are specifically viewed as those ages 18 and older because 
they comprise the voting age population, and it is the opinions of voters to which elected 
officials and policy makers are more likely to pay attention. “Matters of public interest” 
incorporates a broad definition as “any issue of interest to the public, whether at the national, 
state, or local level, and at any point in the political process— during the campaign, prior to the 
vote on an issue, after a policy has been adopted— falls under the scope” (Bardes & Oldendick, 
2012). Private sector concerns in and of themselves must be distinguished from public interest. 
The best video game currently on the market, according to the public, is not relevant within this 
realm of “public interest/opinion.” Rather, their beliefs regarding government regulations on the 
content of such games for violence and nudity would fall under this definition (Bardes & 
Oldendick, 2012). 
Sources of Public Opinion 
Political socialization is outlined as “the process by which people learn to adopt the 
norms, values, attitudes, and behaviors accepted and practiced by the ongoing system” and 
through this multitude of influences, their public opinion views are shaped (Bardes & Oldendick, 
2012). Paul Allen Beck states three conditions are required in order for people to be influenced: 
exposure, communication, and receptivity. As a result, children learn primarily from their parents 
as they maximize exposure, communicate frequently, and maximize conditions for receptivity. 
David Easton then summarizes the four stages that proceed for the political learning of children 
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and adolescents. Stage one is termed politicization and involves children becoming aware of 
authority figures, such as parents, other adults, teachers, laws and rules. In the second step, 
personalization, they identify with specific authority figures, such as George Washington or 
Martin Luther King Jr. Idealization, the third stage, encompasses identifying political authority 
as generally benevolent or trustworthy. Feelings of antipathy toward the government can occur 
for some children, however, as the idealization phase can be replaced by hostilization. The final 
stage is known as institutionalization and is represented by an understanding of political 
institutions (Bardes & Oldendick, 2012). 
Perception plays a vast role in the psychological formation of one’s public opinions. 
Three assumptions underscore several theoretical frameworks for determining this exact role— 
individuals care what others think about public issues; they form perceptions of what others 
think; and they modify their own opinions or behaviors (or both) on the basis of these 
perceptions (Glynn, et al., 2018). The looking-glass framework is defined as “the belief that 
others think the same as oneself” (Glynn, et al., 2018). This has been determined to be fairly 
accurate on uncontroversial issues. However, people in the minority tend to incorrectly perceive 
that most people agree with them on divisive issues. Ruben Orive contends that when 
“individuals cannot conveniently compare their opinions with actual others, they may engage in 
‘social projection’ to create a ‘self-generated’ consensus” (Glynn, et al., 2018). Another form of 
perception is described as pluralistic ignorance. Glynn, Ostman, and McDonald profess that this 
occurs when individuals who hold the majority opinion regarding a given issue incorrectly 
perceive it to be the minority opinion. Ultimately, this leads individuals to consistently misjudge 
the number of others who think, feel, or act as they themselves do (Glynn, et al., 2018). Elizabeth 
Noelle-Neumann produced an alternative to these perceptions: the spiral of silence. She argued 
that people willingly change or repress their opinions in order to earn acceptance from others. 
Relationships are so important to us that to the individual, “not isolating himself is more 
important than his own judgment” (Glynn, et al., 2018). 
Generational influences on opinion are complex. Based on presidential voter patterns, it 
is believed that older Americans are more likely to be Republican in their voting habits and more 
conservative on certain issues. Furthermore, 70% of registered voters over the age of 45 turn out 
to vote, as compared to less than 40% for those ages 18 to 20 years old. The tendency for older 
Americans to identify more as conservative than younger citizens is a generational difference 
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that can be accredited to life cycle effects. “As individuals age, they are more aware than ever of 
their own interests and will express opinions that support those interests, and they are probably 
more aware of changes in society that they do not approve or share” (Bardes & Oldendick, 
2012). Consequently, older generations are less comfortable with change and unwilling to 
participate in the changes that society is currently undergoing. Meanwhile, the younger 
generations of Americans are more interested in establishing their lives by way of a career and 
companionship than in discussing political issues. They are less likely to vote and participate in 
politics at an exceedingly low level. Changes regarding both the participation in and interest of 
public issues generally do not evolve until their priorities of settling down with and providing for 
a family in a given community are met (often age 30 or older) (Bardes & Oldendick, 2012). 
Furthermore, analyses have been conducted to identify true generational effects. A 2004 study 
indicates that individuals who were adolescents during the turbulent 1960s display a greater 
tendency to be liberal than earlier and later generations. Research also demonstrates that 
Americans who became engaged with politics during the Great Depression are likely to still be 
Democratic voters. Likewise, voters whose formative years occurred during the Reagan 
presidency may identify with the Republican Party in greater numbers than other generations. As 
no one party dominated during the years they became engaged, Baby Boomers tend to show 
much less inclination toward one party or another. Notably, “partisan identity, once fixed either 
by childhood socialization or a generational event, tends to persist for the rest of the individual’s 
life if the attachment is strong enough” (Bardes & Oldendick, 2012). 
The role in which the mass media plays in influencing the public opinion of an individual 
is also a vast topic. Today, there is a preferred form of media for almost everyone as news is 
reported in newspapers, political journals, radio, television, the Internet, etc. Foremost, numerous 
indirect effects of media exposure exist via agenda setting, framing, and priming. Agenda setting 
is a primary function of media outlets, as they shape the public’s view of the most important 
issues of the day by identifying which stories and debates to cover and direct into the headlines. 
Framing is achieved by influencing how citizens regard certain topics by emphasizing or de-
emphasizing certain facets of the issue. Giving media consumers criteria by which to choose 
their own positions on the issues is known as priming. “For example, an emphasis on the loss of 
jobs and the slowdown of the economy in conjunction with stories about the President could 
‘prime’ citizens to think of the economic downturn as the president’s fault” (Bardes & 
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Oldendick, 2012). “Horse-race” journalism, which focuses on the competitive nature of political 
campaigns instead of a candidate’s platform or past experience, also primes voters to evaluate 
candidates merely in terms of their likelihood of winning an election. 
The influence of school is not as significant as previously mentioned factors. Schools in 
the American education system often possess poor civics curricula and are more effective at 
teaching obedience than teaching responsibilities. College presents different findings, though, as 
an education at that level increases support for political tolerance and democratic values. It also 
has a liberalizing effect on students, for the number of people with post-graduate educations are 
more likely to identify as liberal than college graduates and noncollege graduates. Similarly, 
friends and peer groups do not play a large role in the development of one’s public opinions. 
This is because people tend to choose friends who are analogous. A person’s peer will endure a 
similar socioeconomic status, live in a similar region, and have a similar job and interests. 
Therefore, they tend to simply reinforce and solidify one’s views (Bardes & Oldendick, 2012). 
Criticisms and Problems 
While the data measured by public opinion is valuable to assess, it is critical to note that 
there are criticisms within the field and potential problems always exist within the surveys. 
Foremost, in order for public opinion data to be trustworthy, they must be reliable and valid. 
Respectively, they must produce consistent results and measure what they intend to measure. 
Utilizing that definition of public opinion, a number of issues arise such as differences in 
intensity of opinion, the knowledge that underlies opinions, the division of opinion, and the role 
of multiple publics. Intensity of opinion can be defined as the strength of an individual’s views 
on an issue and generates a significant criticism by Herbert Blumer, a sociologist and critic of 
quantitative measurement methods. Blumer criticized the fact that all opinions are equally 
treated, highlighting that the views of an “individual who had never thought about an issue until 
asked about it by a survey interviewer are treated the same as those of a person who had a long-
standing and passionate view on the matter” (Bardes & Oldendick, 2012). Moreover, Blumer 
argued that the summation of individual opinions in a “one person, one vote” style was exactly 
what public opinion was not. He believed that public opinion was more accurately reflected in 
the views of the small number of individuals within a given community who paid more attention 
to and were more knowledgeable about matters of public affairs (Bardes & Oldendick, 2012). 
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Issues also occur when conducting the surveys, especially concerning the questions 
themselves. It is imperative that every member of a selected sample has an equal probability of 
selection and was randomly selected, allowing researchers to employ the Central Limit Theorem 
and generate a standard error. Question wording and order and response order can affect 
responses. Any closed-ended questions must be mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, 
and the open-ended questions must be coded accurately. When contact is made with a 
respondent, there is a potential for people to exhibit nonattitudes, which transpires when 
individuals with a lack of information about a particular issue provide meaningless opinions that 
vary randomly in direction during repeated trials over time. Recency and primacy also affect 
survey responses. An individual is more likely to choose the last option presented (usually in an 
oral format or questions with long options separated by an ‘or’) or they are more likely to choose 
the first option presented that is satisfying (usually in a visual format). In certain cases, 
individuals will also answer questions about issues that do not even exist (Bishop, 2004). 
Additionally, response rates are decreasing which leads to less of the population being sampled. 
Multiple factors influence this decrease including the transition from in-person surveys to 
phones. As telephone answering machines and caller ID have transitioned to cellular phones, 
rates are continuing to decrease. Other factors such as fear of crime, increased cynicism, and 
concerns over privacy issues also contribute to the increase in refusal rates. Societal changes, 
such as the increasing participation of women in the workforce and the reduction in the number 
of adults per household, yields more households that are occupied a smaller percentage of the 
time than before (Bardes & Oldendick, 2012).  
Public Opinion and Policy Making 
 The federal government’s implementation and consequent use of polling data has rapidly 
increased over the past 80 years. Surveys are often used for data collection; however, most of the 
information collected is “not attitudinal data, but rather demographic and behavioral indicators 
that provide the context in which the American mind develops” (Bardes & Oldendick, 2012). 
Various agencies across the federal government, such as the Department of Education, 
Department of Agriculture, and Department of State, utilize polling data to accumulate masses of 
data on demographic characteristics, behavioral indicators, crime victimization, energy-use, 
financial relationships, etc. Furthermore, many agencies conduct surveys for a multitude of 
purposes, including needs assessments, as part of an evaluation of a project or program, or in 
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addressing a specific policy issue. While these surveys are conducted by the agencies 
themselves, there are also numerous programs in which the federal government sponsors surveys 
within the states (Bardes & Oldendick, 2012). 
The effects that public opinion produces on policy making are more equivocal. While the 
evidence for policy implementation in response to public opinion has been extensive, it has also 
been ambiguous and difficult to evaluate on its own terms. “Some researchers perceive public 
opinion as substantially directing many policy debates; others see it as usually only constraining 
policy outcomes, and perhaps not even constraining them very much” (Glynn, et al., 2018). 
Researcher Alan Monroe performed a study that examined “congruence” between majority 
opinion and policy responsiveness. For example: 
If in response to a survey question, 51 percent or more of survey respondents opposed the 
United States establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba, and the government had not 
established such relations up to four years later, this would be a case in which 
government policy was… “congruent” with public opinion (Glynn, et al., 2018). 
Monroe found that policy outcomes were congruent with public opinion in 64% of the 222 
nonspending cases that he examined. When he updated his findings for the period from 1980 to 
1993, the figure declined but remained at 55%. Monroe emphasized, however, that this evidence 
did not establish that public opinion actually influenced policy. When analyzing the Cuban 
relations example, policymakers might simply oppose establishing diplomatic relations 
notwithstanding any public opinion regarding the issue. Moreover, pollsters’ decisions about 
what questions to ask affect the apparent rate of congruence because certain questions, including 
how they are asked, “could quickly establish congruence between public opinion and policy on 
dozens of ‘policy issues’ that are, in most people’s minds, not legitimate issues at all” (Glynn, et 
al., 2018). Additionally, highly salient issues will, in some cases, see policymakers ignore 
relatively clear public opinion. For example, public opinion polls showed that Americans 
generally thought Congress should only censure President Bill Clinton and no more, after his 
actions involving Monica Lewinsky in the 1998 sex scandal. The House Republican leadership, 
ignoring this data, undertook to impeach President Clinton, and eventually the House voted for 
two articles of impeachment, almost entirely along party lines. (Glynn, et al., 2018). In another 
study conducted by Benjamin Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, it was determined that policies had 
moved in the same direction as public opinion 66% of the time. Notably, they analyzed 231 
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instances of changes in policy preferences and changes of policy, and this percentage depended 
on their excluding 120 cases of “no change in policy” (Glynn, et al., 2018). 
Examining Public Opinion of the Executive 
Understanding how public opinion is defined and formulated, as well as the purposes and 
limitations of it, provides a concrete foundation for examining Americans’ opinions of President 
Trump and their desired role for the U.S. to play in world affairs. These facets of the Executive 
branch can also be studied from an international point of view. 
Public Opinions of President Trump 
Spearheading a hotly contested 2016 Presidential election, then-Republican candidate 
Donald J. Trump faced relentless amounts of scrutiny and criticism throughout the race. 
Ultimately, he defeated Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton and became the 45th President of 
the United States of America. However, the strong sentiments towards President Trump did not 
cease. Throughout his time in office, the American public has continued to have robust attitudes 
regarding his handling and leading of the nation. A recent study conducted by Pew Research 
Center indicated that Americans have more confidence in the leaders of France, Japan, and 
Germany to do the right thing regarding world affairs than they have in President Trump. French 
President Emmanuel Macron, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel were all granted confidence ratings of at least 55%. Forty-eight percent of 
Americans reported confidence 
in Donald Trump. This figure 
is ahead of only Xi Jinping of 
China, Narenda Modi of India, 
and Vladimir Putin of Russia. 
Notably, 52% reported having 
no confidence in President 
Trump (Poushter & Fagan, 
2018). 
 Confidence in the 
President’s handling of 
international issues also tends 
to parallel job performance 
U.S. President Donald Trump with German Chancellor Angela Merkel at the G-7 
summit in Charlevoix, Canada, in June. Also pictured: French President Emmanuel 
Macron (left) and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (center). Source: Poushter, 
J., & Fagan, M. (2018, November 05). On global affairs, Americans have more 
confidence in other world leaders than in Trump. Pew Research Center. 
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ratings. As previously stated, 48% of Americans stated they had confidence that President Trump 
would do the right thing in world affairs. Thirty-nine percent also approve of his job 
performance. Comparably, in 2010, 65% of Americans had confidence in newly-elect President 
Barack Obama to do the right thing in world affairs. Forty-seven percent approved of his job 
performance at the time (see Appendix A: Figure 1). 
 Examining confidence in President Trump via party affiliation produces a wider gap. In 
2018, 88% of Republicans acknowledged confidence in him to do the right thing regarding world 
affairs. Sixteen percent of Democrats agreed. In 2010, 89% of Democrats and 34% of 
Republicans reported the same faith in then-President Obama (Poushter & Fagan, 2018). 
Republicans are also more confident in President Trump and Prime Minister Abe than 
Democrats who favor Chancellor Merkel and President Macron. There is a seventy-two-point 
difference for confidence in President Trump and a thirteen-point difference for confidence in 
Prime Minister Abe. Sixteen- and twenty-point differences exist for Democratic favor in 
President Macron and Chancellor Merkel, respectively. While more Republicans also have more 
confidence in President Putin than Democrats, it is still not a majority at 28% (Poushter & Fagan, 
2018). 
 As Americans do not generally possess high of amounts of confidence or appreciation for 
President Trump, he is unable to find any better success among international publics either. 
According to a thirty-seven-country survey by Pew Research Center, 22% of publics stated they 
had confidence in President Trump following his election to the Presidency. Unfavorable views 
of the United States also rose from 26% to 39% after the election (Wike, Stokes, Poushter, & 
Fetterolf, 2017).  
 Despite international publics’ confidence levels in President Trump rising to 27% in 
2018, significant unfavorable views of the U.S. President still exist. Seventy percent assert that 
the U.S. does not take into account the interests of other countries too much or at all. 
Additionally, 37% pronounce the U.S. is doing less to help address major global problems 
(see Appendix A: Figure 2). Favorable views of the United States also vary greatly across the 
globe. Europe and countries such as Germany, Netherlands, and Greece tend to possess less 
favorable views. Asia and countries such as South Korea, Philippines, and Japan tend to display 
greater favorability (see Appendix A: Figure 3). 
COMPARING PUBLIC OPINION AND EXECUTIVE ACTION 13 
 These figures coincide a substantial amount with the numbers generated when inquiring 
about the personal attributes of Donald Trump. Across all characteristics tested, President Trump 
is most likely to be described as arrogant. Seventy-five percent of respondents indicated this, 
with notable data coming from Spain, Canada, Jordan, and Mexico at 94%, 93%, 91%, and 91%, 
respectively. Sixty-five percent of international publics also render him intolerant. Sixty-two 
percent fear him to be dangerous (see Appendix A: Figure 4). Of the thirty-seven nations tested, 
in just ten do the people illustrate President Trump possessing charisma. In even less nations do 
the people deem him well-qualified to be President. His highest grades come from 71% of 
Vietnam, 67% of both Philippines and Ghana, 66% of Nigeria, and 62% of Russia. His lowest 
marks originate in Germany, Sweden, Mexico, Netherlands, Spain, and Japan, which all report 
15% or less (see Appendix A: Figure 5). 
Despite these overwhelmingly negative viewpoints, 55% of publics, including those who 
lack confidence in him, still believe President Trump to be a strong leader (see Appendix B: 
Figure 5). Respondents declare that, over the past decade, China has played a more influential 
role across the world; consequently, respondents were probed, “Thinking about the future, if you 
had to choose, which of the following scenarios would be better for the world: the U.S. is the 
world’s leading power or China is the world’s leading power?” (Wike et al., 2018). The United 
States is the prodigious favorite. Nineteen percent indicate preference for China as compared to 
63% for the U.S. The countries which prefer China include Tunisia, Argentina, and Russia (see 
Appendix A: Figure 6). 
America’s Role in the World 
Through passing generations, the American public has decreasingly identified as 
Republican and conservative and increasingly identified as Democratic and moderate or liberal 
(see Appendix B: Table 1). While party identification is an important factor in predicting one’s 
opinions on the positions the U.S. should maintain in international affairs, it is not the most 
statistically significant. A recent study conducted by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs 
found one’s generation (or age) to be the strongest predictor in one’s views of U.S. involvement 
in foreign affairs. Seventy-eight percent of the Silent Generation, which includes those born 
between 1928 and 1945, believes the U.S. should take an active role in world affairs. Meanwhile, 
51% of the Millennial Generation, those born between 1981 and 1996, agree (Thrall, Smeltz, 
Goepner, Ruger, & Kafura, 2018). While this figure is still a majority, it is a significant decrease 
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in the number of internationalist Americans. At the partisan level, Republicans are no less likely 
to say that the U.S. should play a leading role in world affairs than are Democrats (Newport, 
2018). Specific foreign policy goals vary greatly among each Generation (see Appendix B: Table 
2). These beliefs can perhaps be attributed to each Generations’ views on American superiority. 
Seventy-seven percent of the Silent Generation believes the United States of America is the 
greatest country in the world. This number decreases through the following generations until just 
50% of Millennials believe in American supremacy. Similarly, roughly one-quarter of 
Millennials believe the U.S. should strive to be the dominant world leader (Thrall et al., 2018). 
Comparing Executive Actions in Foreign Affairs With Public Opinion 
“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall 
hold his Office during the Term of four Years…” 
Article II, Section 1, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution 
“The President…of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and 
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” 
Article II, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution  
Trans-Pacific Partnership 
A mere three days after being sworn into the Oval Office, President Trump began to 
fulfill his promise of putting America and its workers first. “By the authority vested in [him] as 
President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America” he directed the 
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative to withdraw the United States from the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, which was established under the Obama Administration (Presidential Memorandum, 
2017). President Trump highlighted how the deal would “push manufacturing jobs overseas, 
increase the U.S. trade deficit, and fail to address currency manipulation by U.S. trade partners” 
(McBride & Chatzky, 2018). Furthermore, it was argued that it would erode and undercut wages, 
lower environmental and labor standards, increase the incentive to move manufacturing 
production to lower-cost countries, as well as provide global corporations with too much 
authority over domestic policymaking. Former Treasury Secretary under President Clinton and 
Director of National Economic Council for President Obama Larry Summers noted the deal’s 
potential to “increase inequality by allowing more earning opportunities for those at the top and 
exposing ordinary workers to more competition” (McBride & Chatzky, 2018). Despite this 
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departure, at least 56% of every generation of Americans either strongly or somewhat supported 
participation in the TPP (Thrall et al., 2018). 
Military 
In early April 2017, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad utilized the chemical weapon sarin 
in an attack against civilians. As a countermeasure, President Trump ordered a limited cruise 
missile strike on the Shayrat Air Base, which had been controlled by the regime, on April 7th, 
2017 (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018). One year later, in April 2018, more U.S. 
military strikes would be ordered on three facilities in Syria that were linked to President Assad’s 
chemical weapons program. As the regime continued its use of chemical attacks against its own 
citizens, the air strikes would serve as another response measure. Forces from France and the 
United Kingdom would join the attack (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018). From 
December 2017 through February 2018, the Trump administration would also release a series of 
documents which portrayed China and Russia as major strategic competitors. These documents 
discussed national security and defense, and the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) would request 
for the construction of two new nuclear missiles for submarines. Additionally, the NPR would 
broaden the requirements for which the U.S. could utilize nuclear weapons in the event of a 
cyberattack (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018). 
When examining the use of military force and the role of the military in U.S. foreign 
policy, the greatest disparities 
across generations can be found. 
Maintaining superior military 
power worldwide is a very 
important goal for 70% of the 
Silent Generation, 64% of the 
Boomers (those born from 1946 to 
1964), 54% of Generation X (those 
born from 1965 to 1980), and 44% 
of Millennials (Thrall et al., 2018). 
Support for the use of force is still 
relatively high, however. Americans of all ages support the use of force for humanitarian 
purposes more often than they do its use to defend allies or conduct regime change (see 
Satellite Imagery of the Shayrat Air Base in Syria following the 
U.S. missile strike. Source: Trump's Foreign Policy Moments. 
(2018, December). Council on Foreign Relations. 
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Appendix B: Table 3). When probed about defense spending, Generation X, the Boomers, and 
the Silents all favor expanding over cutting with margins of +9, +22, and +34, respectively 
(Thrall et al., 2018). Markedly, Millennials are the only generation that supports cutting over 
expanding, which was reported at a margin of +9 (Thrall et al., 2018). Bruce Jentleson, a 
professor of public policy and political science at Duke University, (2018) attempted to explain 
these numbers. He stated, “the United States has been at war in Afghanistan and Iraq for close to 
half the lives of the oldest millennials, who were born in 1981, and most of the lives of the 
youngest, born in 1996. Despite America's vast military power, neither war has been won” 
(Jentleson, 2018). The following questions arise for Millennials then: Why make military 
superiority a priority? Why spend more on defense? Why not be skeptical about other uses of 
force? (Jentleson, 2018). However, on August 21st, 2017, President Trump would announce a 
new approach to the War on Terror that would focus specifically on counterterrorism efforts. He 
promoted a strategy that relies on the “instruments of American power:” diplomacy, economy, 
and military and calls on NATO allies to increase troops and funding. Furthermore, he 
emphasizes that dates and timetables of such events will not be announced and certain 
restrictions on rules of engagement will be lifted. President Trump concludes his speech with the 
statement, “Terrorists take heed: America will never let up until you are dealt a lasting defeat” 
(Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy, 2017).  
Immigrants and Immigration 
President Trump’s decisions regarding immigration into the United States has continually 
been contested. His enduring bid to build a wall has received significantly negative responses as 
only 39% of Americans view building a wall along the U.S. - Mexican border as a very or 
somewhat important goal (Suls, 2017). Encouraging a successor to the Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, President Trump and Attorney General Jeff Sessions also 
announced a departure from the plan on September 5th, 2017. A key program during President 
Obama’s tenure, the exit will leave nearly 800,000 beneficiaries susceptible to deportation 
(Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018). 
Currently, a caravan of migrants, estimated in the thousands, is travelling from Central 
America to the Southwest border of the United States. In a series of early morning Tweets on 
October 29th, 2018, President Trump avowed: 
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Many Gang Members and some very bad people are mixed into the Caravan heading to 
our Southern Border. Please go back, you will not be admitted into the United States 
unless you go through the legal process. This is an invasion of our Country and our 
Military is waiting for you! (realDonaldTrump, 2018). 
This message would be followed with the deployment of over 5,000 troops to the southern 
border. Engineers, planners, military police, pilots, cooks, and medical personnel will comprise 
those who are being deployed and their activities will include building camps to house Customs 
and Border Patrol personnel along the border (Bowman & Wamsley, 2018). The cause for 
support roles being commissioned is the Posse Comitatus Act (PSA). The PSA bars U.S. military 
personnel from direct participation in law enforcement activities, including interdicting vehicles, 
vessels, and aircraft; conducting surveillance, searches, pursuit and seizures; or making arrests 
on behalf of civilian law enforcement authorities. Specifically, Section 1385 of Title 18, U.S.C., 
states: 
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the 
Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a 
posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned…or both (The Posse Comitatus Act of 2013). 
However, Congress has enacted a number of exceptions to the PCA that allow the military, in 
certain situations, to assist civilian law enforcement agencies in enforcing the laws. One avenue 
that could be employed by President Trump would be Sections 371-381 of Title 10, U.S.C., that 
allow counterdrug assistance (The Posse Comitatus Act of 2013). President Trump has indicated 
his desire to send anywhere from 10,000 to 15,000 total troops to the border (Gonzales, 2018). 
Markedly, the current figure is roughly equal to the total number of troops currently stationed in 
Iraq and Syria combined and with his desired increase could equal the number of troops in 
Afghanistan (Chiwaya & Wu, 2018).  
Currently, about half of Latinos say their situation in the U.S. has worsened over the past 
year and convey serious concerns about their place in American society. Moreover, 55% indicate 
worry that they, a family member, or a close friend could be deported. These feelings are the 
result of President Trump’s administration being “harmful to Hispanics” according to 67% of 
respondents (Lopez, Gonzalez-Barrera, & Krogstad, 2018). Internationally, President Trump 
receives equally as negative views. Sixty-two percent of international publics express discontent 
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for introducing tighter restrictions on those entering the U.S. from some majority-Muslim 
countries. Additionally, 76% of respondents are against building a wall on the border between 
the U.S. and Mexico (Wike et al., 2017). 
NAFTA 
In a letter to Congress, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer acknowledged 
President Trump and the White House’s intent to “modernize” the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). Originally established in 1994 with Canada and Mexico, they wished to 
include “new provisions to address intellectual property rights, regulatory practices, state-owned 
enterprises, services, customs procedures, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, labor, 
environment, and small and medium enterprises” (Lighthizer, 2017). The ultimate goal of 
revisiting the agreement was to “seek to support higher-paying jobs in the United States and to 
grow the U.S. economy by improving U.S. opportunities… [the Executive is] committed to 
concluding these negotiations with timely and substantive results for U.S. consumers, businesses, 
farmers, ranchers, and workers” (Lighthizer, 2017). Notably, Americans were split on their 
support of NAFTA. Forty-eight percent affirm it had been good for the country, while 46% 
proclaim it had been bad (Swift, 2017). Nevertheless, on October 1st, 2018, President Trump 
would publicize the arrival of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), formerly 
known as NAFTA. This trade deal contains a number of new provisions. Notably, it established 
stronger labor protections and fairer standards and greater protections for digital trade and 
intellectual property. Higher standards for the auto industry will also be generated which 
includes stronger rules of origin and “requiring at least 75% of every automobile to be made in 
North America in order to qualify for the privilege of free access to [those] markets” so as to 
ultimately usher in a new dawn for the American auto industry and autoworker (Remarks by 
President Trump on the United States, 2018). 
NATO 
President Trump made his first trip abroad as President of the United States in May 2017 
when he travelled to Saudi Arabia, Israel, the West Bank, Italy, Vatican City, and Belgium. In 
Riyadh, he delivered a speech calling on the Muslim world to unite against terrorism. Leaders 
from over fifty Arab- and Muslim-majority nations were present during this speech (Trump’s 
Foreign Policy Moments, 2018). In Brussels, President Trump demanded that North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) “members must finally contribute their fair share and meet their 
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financial obligations, for 23 of the 28 member nations are still not paying what they should be 
paying and what they’re supposed to be paying for their defense” (Remarks by President Trump 
at NATO, 2017). He also notes that if NATO members spent just two percent of their GDP on 
defense, an additional $119 billion would have been produced for their collective defense and 
financing of additional NATO reserves (Remarks by President Trump at NATO, 2017). In Italy, 
President Trump participated in the Group of Seven meeting and joined the U.S. in a joint 
declaration on fighting protectionism, which can be defined as the theory or practice of shielding 
a country's domestic industries from foreign competition by taxing imports (Trump’s Foreign 
Policy Moments, 2018). Ranging from 67% to 76% of among Generations, many still believe 
NATO to be beneficial to the U.S. (Thrall et al., 2018).  
Paris Climate Accord 
“As President, I can put no other consideration before the wellbeing of American 
citizens” (Statement by President Trump, 2017). President Trump emphasizes this point as he 
announces to the other 194 countries who previously signed on to the Paris Climate Accord that 
the United States will be withdrawing from the agreement. The decision to withdrawal comes 
despite the fact that over 69% of each generation supports participation in the Paris Agreement 
(Thrall, et al., 2018). He highlights the constrictions on U.S. sovereignty and its disadvantaging 
of the American economy and American workers. He states that the “cost to the economy at this 
time would be close to $3 trillion in lost GDP and 6.5 million industrial jobs, while households 
would have $7,000 less income” (Statement by President Trump on the Paris, 2017). Notably, 
President Trump wants to ensure that America remains the world’s leader on environmental 
issues but does so under a framework that is “fair and where the burdens and responsibilities are 
equally shared among the many nations all around the world,” including the world’s leading 
polluters. Specifically, he references China’s massive carbon emissions and the coal mines 
allowed to be built in India and Europe but that are supposed to be abolished in the U.S. 
(Statement by President Trump, 2017). Reiterating his belief of “America first,” President Trump 
concludes his speech with the statement, “It is time to put Youngstown, Ohio, Detroit, Michigan, 
and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania…before Paris, France” (Statement by President Trump, 2017). 
North Korea 
After North Korea’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un threatened to launch ballistic missiles 
into the area surrounding Guam, President Trump warned, “North Korea best not make any more 
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threats to the United States. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen” 
(Remarks by President Trump Before a Briefing, 2017). Occurring on August 8th, 2017, hostile 
exchanges would continue to occur between the leaders (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 
2018). September 19th, 2017 would call for President Trump’s first discourse to the United 
Nations General Assembly. During the speech, he warns North Korea of “total [destruction]” if 
the U.S. is “forced to defend itself or its allies” (Remarks by President Trump to the 72nd 
Session, 2017). Moreover, he advocates for a strong, sovereign U.S. that serves as a beacon of 
light and hope to other nations because “in America, we do not seek to impose our way of life on 
anyone, but rather to let it shine as an example for everyone to watch” (Remarks by President 
Trump to the 72nd Session, 2017). Calling on not only the present world leaders, but their 
respective citizens as well, President Trump wishes for nations across the world to “reawaken” 
and revitalize their spirits, pride, people, and patriotism so as to defeat the evils of the world and 
bring a new comradery among all (Remarks by President Trump to the 72nd Session, 2017). 
On March 18th, 2018, President Trump would accept an invitation from North Korean 
Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un to meet. The summit would not only serve as an opportunity to 
discuss the denuclearization of North Korea but would be the first summit between a sitting U.S. 
President and his North Korean counterpart (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018). On June 
12th, 2018, President Trump and Supreme Leader Jong-un would meet in Singapore and facilitate 
a relationship built on cooperation as opposed to confrontation. Although ambitious 
commitments were made, few plans were established to achieve such goals, one of which 
includes the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula (Trump’s Foreign Policy 
Moments, 2018). Forty-six percent of Americans currently describe North Korea as an enemy of 
the U.S., and 58% of Americans view North Korea as a long-term threat. Among Democrats, 
52% describe North Korea as an enemy of the U.S. The percentage of Independents and 
Republicans who agree is 45% and 42%, respectively (Jones, 2018). 
Iran 
Speaking on the Iran nuclear deal, President Trump broadcasts on October 13th, 2017 that 
he will not recertify Iran’s compliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to 
Congress (JCPOA). Citing Iran’s negative behavior, he claims that they have violated the spirit 
of the agreement and solicits Congress to consider reemploying sanctions. Notably he does not 
initiate steps to nullify JCPOA (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018). With 56% of the 
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Boomers displaying the lowest figure among generations, the number of individuals who support 
an agreement that lifts some international economic sanctions against Iran remained relatively 
high (Thrall et al., 2018). On the contrary, President Trump would eventually announce that the 
United States would withdraw from the JCPOA on May 8th, 2018. He proclaimed that Iran did 
not sufficiently curtail its civilian nuclear program nor its regional aggression. Consequently, the 
U.S. would reinstate multiple sanctions on Iran that had previously been waived as a result of the 
original deal (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018). These first set of sanctions, which 
arrived on August 7th, 2018, includes restrictions on Iran’s purchase of U.S. currency, their trade 
in gold and other precious metals, and the sale of Iran auto parts, commercial passenger aircraft, 
and related parts and services. The second set of sanctions, which arrived on November 4th, 
2018, restricts the sale of oil and petrochemical products from Iran (CFR.org Editors, 2018). 
Markedly, international publics indicate a 49% disapproval rate for U.S. withdrawal from the 
Iran nuclear weapons agreement (Wike et al., 2017). 
Jerusalem 
On May 14th, 2018, President Trump would officially move the U.S. embassy from Tel 
Aviv to Jerusalem (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018). When Israel declared its 
independence in 1948, the Green Line was established, which gave Israel control over the 
western half of Jerusalem and Jordan control over the eastern half of the city. In 1967, Israel 
captured East Jerusalem, annexed it, and eventually declared the whole city as its capital. Passed 
on December 13th, 1980 by Israel’s Parliament the 9th Knesset, the “intention of the law [was] to 
establish the status of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and secure its integrity and unity 
[for]…Jerusalem is the seat of the President of the State, the Knesset, the Government and the 
Supreme Court” (Basic Laws, 2018). The Oslo Accords would then be signed by Israel and the 
Palestine Liberation Organization in 1993, which avowed that Jerusalem’s disposition could only 
be decided on in permanent-status negotiations between the two parties (Laub, 2017). The 
Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995, passed by the U.S. Congress, requires the relocation of the U.S 
embassy in Tel Aviv to Jerusalem but allows for Presidents to waive the requirement in six-
month intervals in order to protect national security interests. Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. 
Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump have all issued waivers; as a result, this has illustrated, 
in the past, that the U.S. wishes to remain a neutral mediator in the disputes between Israelites 
and Palestinians over the capital (Laub, 2017). However, departing from decades of Presidential 
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standards, President Trump officially recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel on December 
6th, 2017. Fulfilling a campaign promise and stating that Israel is a sovereign nation capable of 
determining its own capital, he believed this acknowledgment to be crucial to achieving lasting 
peace in the region (Statement by President Trump on Jerusalem, 2017). In the eyes of the 
American public, just 42% say Donald Trump is “striking the right balance” in the situation in 
the Middle East. By party, 79% of Republicans say they sympathize more with Israel than the 
Palestinians, compared with just 27% of Democrats (Republicans and Democrats, 2018). 
Trade 
Public opinion regarding international trade serves as the one facet of foreign affairs that 
President Trump has often found himself on the positive side of when interacting with other 
nations. Ranging from 60% of Boomers to 70% of Millennials, there is concurrence that 
globalization, which is defined as the process by which businesses or other organizations develop 
international influence or start operating on an international scale, is mostly good. Thrall et al. 
(2018) explain this relationship by purporting: 
For younger Americans, the Internet, the steady flow of iPhones, computers and other 
products from abroad, and the expansion of global travel may have all contributed to a 
rising comfort level with the rest of the world generally, and to the acceptance that 
international trade is simply part of the fabric of the modern world. 
Furthermore, at least 52% of all generations believe that international trade is good for the U.S. 
economy, consumers like them, and for creating jobs in the U.S. (Thrall et al., 2018).  
In a roughly two-week trip through Asia, President Trump traveled to Japan, South 
Korea, China, Vietnam, and the Philippines beginning on November 3rd, 2017. Trade and 
nations’ varying relationships with North Korea underscored the itinerary, but a “new vision for 
U.S. involvement in the ‘Indo-
Pacific’” was also introduced 
(Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 
2018). At the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation summit in 
Vietnam, he would promote 
American prosperity and trade via 
new investments and energy sales 
Presidents Trump and Xi meet at the G20 summit in Buenos Aires. 
Source: Trump's Foreign Policy Moments. (2018, December). 
Council on Foreign Relations. 
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that would produce more jobs for Americans (President Donald J. Trump’s Participation, 2017). 
In Manila, officials from the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India would convene to discuss their 
apprehensions regarding China’s rise in power (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018). In 
March 2018, President Trump would announce the imposition of tariffs on foreign-made steel 
and aluminum. Specifically citing national security concerns, he references the Secretary of 
Commerce’s reports on the effects of the importation of aluminum and steel. The reports state 
that the high volume of imports is weakening the internal U.S. economy and forcing the nation to 
be reliant on foreign producers. Furthermore, the domestic industries will potentially be “unable 
to satisfy existing national security needs or respond to a national security emergency that 
requires a large increase in domestic production” (Presidential Proclamation, 2018). These 
restrictions would be imposed on nations such as China, but they were suspended until 
discussions of long-term alternative means occurred for Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
Mexico, South Korea, and the members of the European Union (President Trump, 2018). The 
distinct application towards China would coincide with American beliefs as over six in ten 
citizens report that China's trade practices are unfair (Newport, 2018). After the United States 
imposed these duties, however, China would retaliate with tariffs on U.S. products in the 
beginning of April 2018. By November 2018, the world’s two largest economies will have 
escalated the trade war immensely. The U.S. levied tariffs on about $250 billion worth of 
Chinese products, while China reciprocated the imposition on about $110 billion worth of U.S. 
goods (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018). At the Group of Twenty summit in early 
December 2018, Presidents Trump and Xi Jinping would agree to an armistice and plan to 
formulate a broader trade deal within ninety days (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018). 
Earlier in 2017 President Trump would, notably, roll back President Obama’s 
rapprochement with Cuba. He declared that the United States would enforce the ban on tourism 
and the embargo until it could be ensured that investments were afforded to the Cuban people 
directly. He wants them to begin to build their country’s future without the threat of the Castro 
regime (Remarks by President Trump on the Policy, 2017).  
Other Decisions 
Other foreign policy pronouncements have drawn criticism as well. On June 19th, 2018, 
U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley would announce the withdrawal of the U.S. 
from the Human Rights Council. Citing the hypocrisy associated with the Council, Haley 
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describes a “chronic bias against Israel” and questionable human rights practices by members 
such as Venezuela, China, and Saudi Arabia. Critics believe, though, that the only way to move 
forward is to remain engaged and work with the partners (Dwyer, 2018). Additionally, when 
Jamal Khashoggi, a dissident Saudi journalist and Washington Post columnist, was assassinated 
inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October 2018, investigations and accusations began to 
swirl. Evidence appeared to incriminate Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman. 
However, President Trump expressed support for the Saudi leadership, signaling the regional 
relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States which includes the supply of oil and 
purchasing of U.S. arms. This response drew backlash from the U.S. Congress and its allies 
(Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018). 
The Future 
As the future approaches, certainty that overall U.S. foreign policy is headed in the right 
direction varies significantly based on age and party identification. The majority of Republicans 
of all ages believe these policies to be headed in the right direction yet the majority of Democrats 
of all ages do not agree. Furthermore, no age group occupies a majority who are confident 
moving forward. Overall, only 40% of Boomers, 32% of Generation X, and 29% of Millennials 
feel current U.S. foreign policy is headed in the right direction (see Appendix A: Figure 7). 
President Trump has displayed a tendency, however, to consistently execute policy 
implementations that directly contradict the wishes of many American citizens. Ultimately, these 
decisions embody his desire to put “America first” and make it great again, even at the cost of 
domestic and international support.  
Significant Legal Cases Involving Executive Decisions 
Of President Trump’s numerous foreign policy decisions, two in particular have garnered 
significant legal attention and found themselves traversing the U.S. court system. The first 
involved an executive order restricting immigration and would ultimately be decided by the U.S. 
Supreme Court on June 26th, 2018. The second involved an executive order that utilized the 
longstanding Flores Settlement Agreement for legal justification of family separations and 
migrants crossing the border. 
The “Travel Ban” 
Citing the Constitution of America and its laws, including the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S. Code (U.S.C.) §1101, and 3 U.S.C. §301, President Trump would 
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sign Executive Order 13769 (Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist entry into the United 
States). Occurring on January 27th, 2017, this order would suspend for 90 days the entry of 
certain aliens from seven countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen because 
they had been “identified as presenting heightened concerns about terrorism and travel to the 
United States” (Executive Order, 2017). These heightened threats would consist of each country 
being a state sponsor of terrorism, being significantly compromised by terrorist organizations, or 
containing active conflict zones, which all weaken the “foreign government’s willingness or 
ability to share or validate important information about individuals seeking to travel to the 
United States” (Executive Order, 2017).  Specifically referencing 8 U.S.C. §1182(f), he states: 
Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the 
United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by 
proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all 
aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of 
aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate (Executive Order, 2017). 
Additionally, Executive Order 13769 would temporarily suspend the U.S. Refugee Admissions 
Program (USRAP) for 120 days “pending review of [the] procedures for screening and vetting 
refugees” (Executive Order, 2017). For both forms of entry, he also permitted the Secretary of 
State and Secretary of Homeland Security to jointly grant case-by-case waivers when they 
determined it was in the national interest to do so.  
Immediately following the signing of the order, a Washington state judge would block 
part of it, which ignited a media firestorm and a series of judicial challenges surrounding what 
opponents of the order would label the “Muslim Ban” (six out of seven of the countries are 
predominantly Muslim) (Trump’s Foreign Policy Moments, 2018). Explicitly stating that 
Executive Order 13769 did not provide a basis for discriminating for or against members of any 
particular religion, President Trump would later refute claims of any form of disposition: 
While that order allowed for prioritization of refugee claims from members of persecuted 
religious minority groups, that priority applied to refugees from every nation, including 
those in which Islam is a minority religion, and it applied to minority sects within a 
religion. That order was not motivated by animus toward any religion but was instead 
intended to protect the ability of religious minorities — whoever they are and wherever 
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they reside — to avail themselves of the USRAP in light of their particular challenges 
and circumstances (Executive Order, 2017). 
The order would navigate the U.S. legal system over the following months. As various rulings 
were issued by federal judges, President Trump would produce updated versions in attempts to 
comply with the rulings. In September 2017, he would issue Proclamation No. 9645, which 
sought “to improve vetting procedures for foreign nationals traveling to the United States by 
identifying ongoing deficiencies in the information needed to assess whether nationals of 
particular countries present a security threat” (Trump v. Hawaii, 2018).  
Similar to its predecessors, this order placed entry restrictions on the nationals of eight 
foreign states whose systems for managing and sharing information about their nationals were 
judged to be incompetent. An extensive review of each nation was performed by the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS), State Department, and other intelligence agencies. Initially, they 
developed an information and risk assessment “baseline.” They proceeded to collect and analyze 
data for all foreign governments, identify “those having deficient information-sharing practices 
and presenting national security concerns, as well as other countries ‘at risk’ of failing to meet 
the baseline” (Trump v. Hawaii, 2018). Diplomatic efforts to encourage foreign governments to 
improve their practices were then made, but it was concluded that Chad, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North 
Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen remained inadequate. Entry restrictions for certain 
nationals from each country were recommended with the exception of Iraq, which maintained a 
cooperative relationship with the United States. The recommendations varied based on the 
“distinct circumstances” in each of the eight countries. Lawful permanent residents were 
exempted, and case-by-case waivers could be provided under certain circumstances. It also 
directed the DHS to assess on a continuing basis whether the restrictions should be modified or 
continued, with reports to the President occurring every 180 days. (Trump v. Hawaii, 2018). 
President Trump, after consulting with multiple Cabinet members, implemented the 
recommendations and dispensed the Proclamation. Again, referencing his authority under 8 
U.S.C. §§1182(f) and 1185(a), he determined that certain restrictions were necessary to “‘prevent 
the entry of those foreign nationals about whom the United States Government lacks sufficient 
information’ and ‘elicit improved identity management and information-sharing protocols and 
practices from foreign governments’” (Trump v. Hawaii, 2018). Notably, at the completion of 
the first such review period, President Trump lifted restrictions on Chad after the first review 
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revealed that Chad had sufficiently improved its practices. The Proclamation, however, would 
ultimately face the U.S. Supreme Court on April 25th, 2018 after the State of Hawaii, three 
individuals with foreign relatives affected by the entry suspension, and the Muslim Association 
of Hawaii claimed that the Proclamation violated the INA and the Establishment Clause (Trump 
v. Hawaii, 2018). 
In a 5-4 decision, Chief Justice John Roberts would deliver the opinion of the Court in 
favor of President Trump: 
By its plain language, §1182(f) grants the President broad discretion to suspend the entry 
of aliens into the United States. The President lawfully exercised that discretion based on 
his findings—following a worldwide, multi-agency review—that entry of the covered 
aliens would be detrimental to the national interest. And plaintiffs’ attempts to identify a 
conflict with other provisions in the INA, and their appeal to the statute’s purposes and 
legislative history, fail to overcome the clear statutory language (Trump v. Hawaii, 2018). 
The majority would proceed to provide their understanding of the textual limits in §1182(f). As 
the President is authorized to suspend entry “for such period as he shall deem necessary,” they 
acknowledge that the word “suspend” often denotes a “defer[ral] till later,” according to 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary. However, this does not mean that the President is 
required to stipulate in advance a fixed end date for the entry restrictions. Considering that a 
President may suspend entry in response to a diplomatic dispute or policy concern, it is 
acceptable for him to “link the duration of those restrictions, implicitly or explicitly, to the 
resolution of the triggering condition” (Trump v. Hawaii, 2018). They also note that not one of 
the 43 suspension orders issued by past Presidents had specified a precise end date. Furthermore, 
the opinion would reference the Proclamation’s established process of assessing these nations 
and their respective restrictions every 180 days and highlight President Trump’s removal of 
Chad from the list. They underscore the importance of the Proclamation’s ability to modify or 
terminate the “conditional restrictions” that remain in force until the identified “inadequacies and 
risks” are sufficiently addressed (Trump v. Hawaii, 2018). Lastly, the Court refutes plaintiffs’ 
argument that “class” must refer to a well-defined group of individuals who share a common 
“characteristic” apart from nationality. The text of §1182(f) does not state this, and the word 
“class,” according to the majority, “comfortably” incorporates a group of people linked by 
nationality. Plaintiffs contention that a given class cannot be “overbroad” is also repudiated 
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because it “simply amounts to an unspoken tailoring requirement found nowhere in Congress’s 
grant of authority to suspend entry of not only ‘any class of aliens’ but ‘all aliens’” (Trump v. 
Hawaii, 2018). The Court states that the Proclamation “properly identifies a ‘class of aliens’—
nationals of select countries—whose entry is suspended” (Trump v. Hawaii, 2018). 
 In a concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas expanded upon the language of 
§1182(f) by stating that the Section does not set forth any judicially enforceable limits that 
constrain the President. Following this statement, he affirms, “Nor could it, since the President 
has inherent authority to exclude aliens from the country” (Trump v. Hawaii, 2018). Plaintiffs 
also provided evidence that the Proclamation displayed anti-Muslim discrimination in violation 
of the Establishment clause. While the Clause reads, “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof” Justice Thomas described the 
postulated evidence as “unpersuasive” (Trump v. Hawaii, 2018). 
 By ruling in his favor, the U.S. Supreme Court provided President Trump with a 
landmark victory for his Presidency. Although unpopular, his policies have not proven to be 
illegal. Trump v. Hawaii illustrates that the U.S. legal system will grant the President broad and 
extensive powers, especially when engaging the nation in world affairs. 
Family Separations and Flores 
On July 20th, 2018 President Trump stated in an Executive Order, “It is the policy of this 
Administration to rigorously enforce our immigration laws…It is also the policy of this 
Administration to maintain family unity, including by detaining alien families together where 
appropriate and consistent with law and available resources” (Affording Congress an 
Opportunity, 2018). The order, coming after immense backlash from both parties, would reverse 
a “zero tolerance” policy announced in May 2018 by Attorney General Jeff Sessions that aimed 
to prosecute every adult who crossed over the American border illegally and additionally 
separate them from their child as required by law. It would also mandate the DHS, “to the extent 
permitted by law and subject to the availability of appropriations, [to] maintain custody of alien 
families during the pendency of any criminal improper entry or immigration proceedings 
involving their members” (Affording Congress an Opportunity, 2018). The order also directs the 
Defense Department, as well as the heads of all executive departments and agencies, to provide 
available housing for immigrant families and construct such facilities if necessary. Furthermore, 
President Trump conveys that Attorney General Jeff Sessions should ask a federal court to 
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modify the Flores Settlement Agreement (FSA) in Flores v. Sessions, to allow the DHS to 
“detain alien families together throughout the pendency of criminal proceedings for improper 
entry or any removal or other immigration proceedings” (Affording Congress an Opportunity, 
2018). Currently, the FSA requires immigrant children to be released or transferred to a licensed 
facility within a reasonable period, set arbitrarily at 20 days. 
The FSA is the result of a case involving Jenny Lisette Flores, a 15-year-old girl from El 
Salvador who immigrated to the United States in 1985. She fled the violence of El Salvador to be 
reunited with her aunt, who was living in the United States. However, prior to reaching her aunt, 
the formerly-known-as Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) apprehended and arrested 
Jenny at the border. Upon being handcuffed and strip searched, she would spend the next two 
months in a juvenile detention center waiting for her deportation hearing. This facility did not 
provide educational or recreational opportunities, and some of the minors in the facility had to 
share “bathrooms and sleeping quarters with unrelated adults of both sexes” (Lopez, 2012). The 
INS refused to release Jenny to her aunt according to a “regulation, promulgated in 1988 and 
codified at 8 CFR 242.24, which provides for the release of detained minors only to their parents, 
close relatives, or legal guardians, except in unusual and compelling circumstances” (Reno v. 
Flores, 1993). 
The ACLU and four minors, including Jenny, filed a class action lawsuit against the INS, 
the INS Commissioner, and two private operators of INS detention facilities. They sought to 
address the treatment and detention of unaccompanied minors, as well as: 
Challenge [the] (a) INS policy to condition juveniles’ release on bail on their parents’ or 
legal guardians’ surrendering to INS agents for interrogation and deportation; (b) the 
procedures employed by the INS in imposing a condition on juveniles’ bail that their 
parents’ or legal guardians’ surrender to INS agents for interrogation and deportation; and 
(c) the conditions maintained by the INS in facilities where juveniles are 
incarcerated…The plaintiffs alleged that the new policy resulted in lengthy incarceration 
of juveniles in substandard conditions, without education, supervised recreation, or 
reasonable visitation opportunities, unreasonably subjected them to strip and body cavity 
searches, and served as a thinly-veiled device to apprehend the parents of the incarcerated 
juveniles and to punish the children (Lopez, 2012). 
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The minors claimed that they had a right to be released to “the custody of ‘responsible adults’” 
under the constitutional right to due process (Lopez, 2012). 
Initially, the District Court invalidated the regulatory scheme on unspecified due process 
grounds and ordered that "responsible adult part[ies]" be added to the list of persons to whom a 
juvenile must be released. Furthermore, they required that a hearing before an immigration judge 
be held automatically, whether or not the juvenile requests it. The Court of Appeals, en banc, 
affirmed, and the decision was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Ultimately, the Court found 
that the release procedures did not violate the minors’ substantive or procedural due process 
rights. They noted that respondents claimed that the regulation is an abuse of discretion because 
it permits the INS to hold the juvenile in detention indefinitely, once no relative or legal guardian 
is deemed available. The late-Justice Antonin Scalia, in delivering the opinion of the court, 
stated, “The period of custody is inherently limited by the pending deportation hearing, which 
must be concluded with ‘reasonable dispatch’ to avoid habeas corpus” (Reno v. Flores, 1993). 
Expected INS custody length was determined to be an average of thirty days. Additionally, the 
Court described the arrangements as “‘legal custody,’ rather than ‘detention’…since these are 
not correctional institutions, but facilities that meet ‘state licensing requirements for the 
provision of shelter care, foster care, group care, and related services to dependent children’” 
(Reno v. Flores, 1993). The Court also determined that the Attorney General was acting within 
his discretion and remanded the case to the district court. The parties reached a settlement 
agreement before the district court could make a final determination on the case (Lopez, 2012). 
Consequently, the FSA was established and provided a “nationwide policy for the 
detention, release, and treatment of minors in the custody of the INS” (Lopez, 2012). The policy 
required that immigration officials detaining minors provide: 
(1) food and drinking water, (2) medical assistance in the event of emergencies, (3) toilets 
and sinks, (4) adequate temperature control and ventilation, (5) adequate supervision to 
protect minors from others, and (6) separation [of children] from unrelated adults 
whenever possible (Lopez, 2012). 
Moreover, the FSA required that the INS: 
(1) ensure the prompt release of children from immigration detention; (2) place children 
for whom release is pending, or for whom no release option is available, in the “least 
restrictive” setting appropriate to the age and special needs of minors; and (3) implement 
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standards relating to care and treatment of children in U.S. immigration detention (Lopez, 
2012). 
Paragraphs 12A and 14 also require that the INS “release class members…without unnecessary 
delay” to certain adults or place them in a licensed program within five days of apprehension. 
The courts have acknowledged, however, that an extension to the five-day rule is permissible up 
to twenty days: 
At a given time and under extenuating circumstances, if 20 days is as fast as Defendants, 
in good faith and in the exercise of due diligence, can possibly go in screening family 
members for reasonable or credible fear, then the recently implemented DHS polices may 
fall within the parameters of Paragraph 12A of the Agreement (Flores v. Lynch, 2015). 
It is further noted that the extension will be permitted if it allows the DHS to keep the family unit 
together (Flores v. Lynch, 2015). 
Notably, in 2002, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act (HSA), which abolished 
the INS and established the DHS. Many of the functions of the former INS involving care of 
unaccompanied children were then transferred to the Director of the Office of Refugee 
Resettlement (ORR) of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The HSA charges 
ORR with “coordinating and implementing the care and placement of unaccompanied alien 
children…making placement determinations…[and] overseeing the infrastructures and personnel 
of facilities in which unaccompanied children reside” (Homeland Security Act of 2002). ORR is 
further mandated to coordinate its efforts with other government entities and cannot release 
unaccompanied alien children upon their own recognizance. Additionally, the HSA preserves 
those administrative actions to which the INS was a party via a savings clause. This clause states 
that:  
Completed administrative actions of an agency…shall continue in effect according to 
their terms until amended, modified, superseded, terminated, set aside, or revoked in 
accordance with law by an officer of the United States or a court of competent 
jurisdiction, or by operation of law (Homeland Security Act of 2002).  
“Completed administrative actions” is defined as “orders…agreements, grants, contracts, 
certificates, licenses, registrations, and privileges” (Homeland Security Act of 2002). Therefore, 
the Flores Settlement is preserved and remains in effect as an “agreement” preceding the passage 
of the HSA. 
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 On September 7th, 2018, HHS and DHS issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to the 
FSA that would align with President Trump’s desires. Ultimately, the Flores Settlement 
Agreement would hopefully be terminated, and the new rule would create an alternative to the 
existing licensed program requirement for family residential centers, which would include the 
ability to detain family units together during the entirety of their immigration proceedings. New 
rules regarding the apprehension, processing, care, custody, and release of undocumented 
juveniles would potentially go into effect (Homeland Security & Health and Human Services, 
2018). A hearing on the proposed regulations occurred on November 30th, 2018 in the presence 
of Judge Dolly Gee. Ultimately, President Trump has shown, by issuing an executive order to 
reverse the “zero tolerance” policy and end family separations that were occurring, that certain 
public opinion can influence him in part. However, this has not deterred him completely as he 
attempts to terminate and reconstruct a new FSA in his continual fight for tight and secure 
borders. 
Conclusion 
 This paper reviews and analyzes the nature of public opinion by providing a definition for 
public opinion, examining the sources of influence throughout one’s life, analyzing the criticisms 
and problems associated with public opinion, and understanding how this ultimately relates to 
policy making. I have found, as a result of often repudiating it, that public opinion, especially 
among American citizens, does not significantly influence President Trump in the majority of his 
policy decisions regarding U.S. action in foreign affairs. Throughout his tenure, he has 
consistently executed policies that counter the views and ideals of citizens and few of which 
have found themselves in the courtroom. Despite the fact that no majority of any generation of 
Americans feels that current U.S. foreign policy is headed in the right direction, President Trump 
will undoubtedly continue to fulfill his longstanding promise of “making America great again” 
by placing it above all other nations. Although the short-term effects of public opinion regarding 
foreign affairs are currently extraneous to the President, the long-term consequences, whatever 
they may be, will indubitably manifest themselves at the conclusion of the 2020 Presidential 
election. The future of public opinion and the legacy of President Donald Trump will continue to 
undergo new experiences in the years ahead.  
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Figure 3. Countries’ Favorability Towards the U.S.  
Source: 
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Figure 7. Overall Direction of U.S. Foreign Policy 
Source: 
Thrall et al. (2018, June). The Clash of Generations? Intergenerational Change and American 
 Foreign Policy Views. 
Appendix B 
Table 1. The Changing Composition of America 
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Table 2. U.S. Foreign Policy Goals 
Source: 
Thrall et al. (2018, June). The Clash of Generations? Intergenerational Change and American 
 Foreign Policy Views. 
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